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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
easily resolved by prompt notice and investigation. Thus, an early
notice of accident provision would further, not hinder, the purpose
of no-fault, viz, to reimburse injured claimants. 28 2
By establishing as a matter of law that 90 days' notice is reasonable
in the no-fault area, it appears that Justice Wallach is rewriting the pro-
visions of the contract between the parties. In light of well-established
principles of insurance law, the Subia court should have denied plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment. It is suggested that the court over-
stepped the bounds of its judicial function in selecting this forum for
expressing its displeasure with the no-fault notice provisions.
DOLE v. Dow CHEMICAL CO.
Dole counterclaim unavailable against plaintiff suing in representative
capacity.
The CPLR states that "[a] counterclaim may be any cause of action
in favor of one or more defendants ... against one or more plaintiffs,
[or] a person whom a plaintiff represents .... " 233 While the statute's
broad language may appear to permit unrestricted claims back and forth
between the parties regardless of the capacity in which a party appears
in the action, it is an established rule in New York civil procedure that
a defendant's counterclaim against a plaintiff is "restricted to the ca-
pacity in which [the plaintiff] sues. ' 234 The purpose of this rule is to
"preclude an unwarranted mixture of a person's individual and repre-
sentative liabilities and assets through the confusing use of counter-
claims in litigation." 235
It is not surprising, therefore, that in Grierson v. Wagar236 the
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, granted a motion to dismiss a
counterclaim against plaintiff in her individual capacity when plaintiff
had sued as executrix. The action which arose out of an automobile
accident with the defendant was brought by plaintiff to recover damages
incurred. A claimant is entitled to recover interest at 2% per month on all payments not
made within 30 days of the loss. N.Y. INS. LAw § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
232 See Governor's Memorandum of Feb. 13, 1973, Approval of Bills, Comprehensive
Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, in McKINNEY's SESSiON LAws oF Nav Yoan 2335
(1973). See also Comment, New York Adopts No Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37
ALBANY L. Rnv. 662, 671 (1973), wherein it is stated that "the [no-fault] Act was primarily
intended to compensate motor vehicle accident victims quickly for substantially all of
their economic loss."
233 CPLR 3019(a).
234 Ehrlich v. American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 259, 257
N.E.2d 890, 892, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1970) (counterclaim against plaintiff as repre-
sentative of estate not allowed when plaintiff sued in individual capacity); 7B McKmNsa's
CPLR 3019, commentary at 217-18 (1974). See 3 WK&M T 3019.08.
235 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 218 (1974).
236 78 Misc. 2d 479, 357 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1974).
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for the conscious pain and suffering237 and the wrongful death238 of the
testator she represented. Since the decedent had been driving plaintiff's
car at the time of the accident, defendant counterclaimed against plain-
tiff in her individual capacity, seeking indemnification under the doc-
trine of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.239 in the event plaintiff obtained a
judgment for the estate of the decedent. The counterclaim alleged that
plaintiff had been negligent in allowing her car to remain in a defective
condition. In granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim,
the Grierson court held that defendant's claim could only be asserted
against plaintiff by means of a third-party complaint.240
The Grierson rationale was logically correct. Plaintiff, suing as
executrix, had brought the action for the benefit of the testator's dis-
tributees and devisees.2 41 In the eyes of the law, her capacity was that of
"a distinct person and stranger to any right or liability as an indi-
vidual."242 A counterclaim for apportionment of liability for the injury
and death of the deceased would, of necessity, fail to state a cause of
action, since plaintiff, as executrix, had no legal existence prior to the
testator's death.243 This line of reasoning inevitably leads to the con-
clusion reached by the court -that impleader 2" is the proper means
by which defendant might assert his claim for indemnification. 245
As the court noted, "the purpose of the [same capacity] rule is to
preclude the interposition of an unrelated claim, or of a claim which
would, if successful, diminish the represented person's recovery with
something that was only against the representative." 246 Admittedly,
defendant's Dole counterclaim seeking a determination of plaintiff's
personal liability was directly related to plaintiff's cause of action. The
237 N.Y. Esr., Pownas & TRusts LAw § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967) provides that a cause
of action for personal injury survives the death of the injured party and may be con-
tinued by the personal representative of the deceased.
238 The personal representative of the decedent is authorized to bring an action to
recover damages for wrongful death under id. § 54.1.
239 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1972).
240 78 Misc. 2d at 481, 357 N.YS.2d at 353.
241 See id.
242 Leonard v. Pierce, 182 N.Y. 431, 432, 75 NE. 813, 814 (1905).
243 See N.Y. Esr., Powms & TRusrs LAW § 1-2.13 (McKinney 1967).
244 7B McKiNNEa's CPLR 1007 (1963). Impleader is a procedural device whereby a
defendant may join in the action a person not a party who is or may be liable to the
defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. See 7B McK.muy's CPLR
1007, commentary at 90-100 (1974); 3 CARMODY-WArr 2d §§ 19.113 at 365, 19.126 at 397
(1968).
245 The impleader procedure has been recognized as a proper and logical mechanism
for the assertion of a Dole right. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d
288, 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 891 (1972); Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 34 N.Y.S.2d
662 (Dist Ct. Nassau County 1972). See also Birnbaum, Civil Practice, 1973 Survey of New
York Law, 25 SYRACusE L. REv. 349 (1974).
246 78 Misc. 2d at 480, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
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danger inherent in permitting a counterclaim to be asserted in this
action is that a finding of personal liability on the part of the "repre-
sentative" plaintiff would serve to diminish the represented person's
recovery. In a wrongful death action, the personal representative's right
to recover "depends solely on the right of the injured person to recover,
... and although brought by the personal representative, accrues for
the benefit of the distributees. ' 247 Any recovery in a cause of action for
personal injuries becomes part of the decedent's estate.2 48 Therefore, as
the court explained, if defendant is ultimately successful in prosecuting
his counterclaim, the distributees or devisees of the decedent would be
adversely affected as to that part of the judgment for which plaintiff was
found personally liable as a joint tortfeasor.249
Defendants who wish to establish the personal liability of a plaintiff
who has brought suit in a fiduciary capacity are therefore reminded
that due to the substantial possibility of prejudice to the rights of
represented parties, courts will permit such claim to be asserted only by
means of a third-party complaint.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YoRK PRACTICE
Standing to litigate in suits against the civil service.
Standing, a judicially created concept resulting from a blend of
public policy considerations and discretionary judicial restraint, re-
stricts a court's power to render decisions. Recently, in Burke v. Sugar-
man,250 the Court of Appeals unanimously held that persons who pass
a civil service examination and are placed on an eligible list "have
standing to challenge unlawful appointments or designations to posi-
tions for which the list has been established." 25 1
Petitioners in Burke instituted a special proceeding pursuant to
CPLR article 78,252 seeking the removal of certain persons alleged to
have been unlawfully appointed to positions in the New York City
Department of Social Services. These employees had been promoted
from without the appropriate eligible list, in contravention of the
247 N.Y. Esr., PoWERs & TRuSts LAW § 5.4-4(a) (McKinney 1967) provides that the
damages are "exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's distributees and, when col-
lected, shall be distributed to the persons entitled thereto.
248 Id. § 11-3.3(a).
249 78 Misc. 2d at 481, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
250 35 N.Y.2d 39, 315 N.E.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974), rev'g 41 App. Div. 2d 1026,
344 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Ist Dep't 1973) (mem.).
251 35 N.Y.2d at 44, 315 N.E-2d at 774, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
252 See generally Fox, Reviewability of Quasi-Legislative Acts of Public Officials in
New York Under Article 78 of the CPLR, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 49 (1964); Weintraub,
Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action: From State
Writs to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 38 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 86 (1963).
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